

# AAI in EGI

## Current status

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# User authentication in a federated environment

- **Local environment** (e.g. one institution, one cluster)
  - Users have local accounts, validated often in a F2F verification with the system administrator
  - All the needed information are filled in at the moment of the registration
- **Federated environment** (e.g. distributed infrastructure)
  - Users do not have local accounts on every service/cluster/centre
  - Users own credentials that are recognized by all the service providers in the federation
  - Identity providers and service providers must agree on the:
    - Information provided to the SP
    - Level of assurance of the credentials
    - Operations of the IdP

- A user must be able to authenticate with the same identity on the distributed services
- From the **user's point of view**
  - Uniform authentication enable cross-site workflows
  - Use of distributed resources using the same credential
- From the **service provider's** point of view
  - Uniform authentication improves security operations in a federated environment
  - Easier management of users, and their access to resources

- For some workflows and use cases, **delegation** is an important capability
  - Applications that in general need to: access data stored by the user and not publicly accessible or to save data in the user's storage area
  - Portals and scientific gateways do actions on behalf of the user, like job submission to compute resources.
- This is usually implemented by **impersonating** and **delegating**
  - Impersonation: the application/service acts as the user (using user's temporary credentials). Done at authentication level.
  - Delegation: the user enables the service to work on his/her behalf. Done at authorization level



Not all the credentials are the same!

Examples:

- Very high level of assurance: eID
- High level of assurance with ID verification:
  - X509 certificates, many institutional IdP
- Social media credentials
  - Everyone with an email account can have one
- Not always the highest LoA is required: for some low-risk activities low assurance credentials are usable!
- The minimum LoA required is determined by the user community and the service provider requirements



## Level of assurance: examples of use cases

- Strong authentication
  - Submit and manage virtual machines
  - Access sensitive protected data
- Medium authentication
  - Submit pre-defined applications through science gateways
  - Use PaaS on the cloud
- Low authentication
  - Access open data
  - Perform read-only operation on non-sensitive data

# Authorization in a federated environment

- In a federated environment individual user authorization cannot be handled by the service provider
  - Service provider does not know the user and if him/her should be allowed to perform a specific action
- Rules for the authorization must use information associated with the user
  - Provided by the IdP
  - Provided by the research collaboration who grants users access to resources

# Distribute collaboration management in EGI: Virtual Organization


- **Virtual Organization:** *A group of researchers with common interests, requirements and applications, who need to work collaboratively and/or share resources.*
- Service providers enable users to access services and resources based on the **VO membership** and additional attributes such as **roles** within the VO and sub-**groups** of users within the VO
- The VO membership is managed by the **VO Manager(s)** who is the main contact with EGI and who knows the users and the groups in the collaboration
  - New users can be added and removed enabling/disabling their access rights, without direct intervention of service providers
  - VO Manager usually does not manage users credential, a VO is not an IdP



## EGI user authentication: X509 certificates


- X509 certificates are the main authentication technology used in EGI
  - Trust network of certification authorities (IGTF/ EUGridPMA)
  - EGI services are configured to accept certificates released by the Certification Authorities federated within IGTF
- You have one IGTF personal certificate → you can authenticate wherever in EGI

# Authentication and Authorization workflow




# Robot certificates and science gateways

Portals and Scientific Gateways can hide the complexity of X509 certificates to the users



# Improving the use of robot certificates



# Extend the X509 mechanism

- For some users approaching EGI, the X509 mechanism is a barrier
  - They do not have easy access to a Certification Authority
  - They would prefer to continue using their institutional credentials
  - VOs and Resource Providers implement portals to ease the access to the resources
- The most effective solution is to bridge other identity federations (eduGAIN, institutional IdP) with the EGI AAI
  - Technical bridge: credentials translation, support in the middleware for other AuthN protocols
  - Policy bridge: build trust between SP and IdP, enable different level of trust
- More in the next talk!

# Summary: Current EGI Services for AAI

- EUGridPMA **network of Certification Authorities** operated by the NGIs
- All EGI services are configured to accept EUGridPMA certificates
  - Certificates enable: web authentication, command line authentication and delegation
- **VOMS** services to manage VO membership and attributes
- **Science gateways** to use other types of authentication (username/password) and **robot certificates** to access EGI services

# Thank you for your attention.

## *Questions?*



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